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INFOMERCIALS, DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING
AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
I. Introduction
"Infomercials" 1 are a new form of television advertising based on
program-length, direct response marketing. A typical infomercial
presentation takes the form of a half hour talk show program devoted
exclusively to the product being marketed, accompanied by toll-free
telephone numbers to order the product. 2 Often, the program is en-
hanced with celebrity guests, a studio audience and demonstrations of
the product.
Recently, there has been growing concern among consumers,
broadcasters and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" or "the
Commission") that infomercials may be a form of deceptive advertis-
ing.' Complaints about infomercials range from objections to the
hard sell tactics,4 to the apprehension that. products will not work for
buyers at home as well as they have on television.' The greatest fear
is that the public will mistake the paid advertisement with its paid
endorsements and pre-arranged demonstrations for an actual, objec-
tive talk show.6 These problems are further complicated by the talk-
show magazine style format of the programs and current require-
ments of only minimal identification of the paid nature of the pro-
gram. There is also a high likelihood that a rapidly spoken script or a
briefly flashed disclaimer will fail to disclose all necessary information
to the consumer. Despite these complaints, the FTC has only taken
action against a few obviously deceptive advertisements. In addition,
no guidelines or rules have been issued.
In order to understand this new and potent addition to the adver-
tiser's arsenal, it is necessary to understand the nature of deceptive
1. Generally, "[i]nfomercials" are "advertisements presented in the guise of a talk-
show format." FTC v. California Pacific Research, Inc., 1991-2 Trade Cases CCH 1
69,564 (D.C. Nev. 1991). Infomercials were first developed by corporations in efforts to
expand into the cable TV markets, where air-time is generally cheaper thus allowing for
longer advertisements. See Investing in Cable TV- Only For The Super Rich, UPI, Mar.
9, 1982, available in Lexis, Nexis library, UPI file.
2. For examples of infomercials, refer to the television guide under "paid program-
ming". In any given week there are usually up to ten half hour infomercial segments per
day.
3. See Joanne Lipman, 'Infomercial' Makers Try to Clean Up Act, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 4, 1991, at B3.
4. Mary Beth Grover, Step Right Up Ladies and Gentlemen, FORBES, Oct. 15, 1990,
at 43.
5. Id.
6. Id.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
television advertising as well as the powers of the public's watchdog,
the FTC. Part II of this Note delves into the history and powers of
the FTC. Part III examines the stance that the FTC has assumed
regarding deceptive advertising. Part IV analyzes the new infomercial
format. Part V applies FTC guidelines to the infomercial format and
concludes that infomercials are precariously close to violating com-
monly held standards for deceptive advertising. As a form of decep-
tive advertising, infomercials must be altered to forewarn the unwary
consumer, and Part VI proposes solutions for the infomercial industry
to help prevent further deception.
II. History of the FTC and Scope of Powers
A. The Origins of FrC Powers
The FTC was originally established in 1914 by the Federal Trade
Commission Act (the "Act").7 The Commission was not formed to
monitor advertising, but was established to enforce antitrust regula-
tions in the wake of the judicial proclamation of the "rule of reason".'
While the FTC was "seen as an agency to champion congressional
antitrust concern," the Commission itself decided that its function
was also to be the enforcer of honesty in advertising.9 The terms of
the Act specified that "unfair methods of competition are hereby de-
clared unlawful." 10 The Commission construed the scope of these
terms to include the responsibilities of preventing false advertising.
Although the role of advertisement enforcer was not necessarily in-
tended by Congress, the prevailing opinion is that it was "a fortuitous
by-product" of the terms of the Act." Thus, from the first cease and
desist orders, the FTC pursued false advertising under authority of
the Act.
12
The courts, on the other hand, were not entirely persuaded that the
Act granted unequivocal jurisdiction over false advertising. Because
the Act specified that unfair "competition" was the standard for juris-
diction, the question arose whether injury to competition was a pre-
requisite to FTC action. In 1931, the Supreme Court faced the issue
7. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1992) (effective Sept. 26, 1914).
8. See Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911). The Antitrust Act of
1890 should be construed in the light of reason and as such prohibits all activities which
amount to an unreasonable restraint on interstate trade.
9. GEORGE J. ALEXANDER, HONESTY AND COMPETITION 1 (1967).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1992).
11. EARL W. KINTNER, A PRIMER ON THE LAW OF DECEPTIVE PRACTICES 56
(1978).
12. The first orders were directed against false advertising. See ALEXANDER, supra
note 9, at 1.
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in FTC v. Raladam Co.. 13 The Court held that proof of an adverse
effect upon competition was a necessary prerequisite to any FTC ac-
tion against false advertising, thereby stripping the FTC of much of
its power.14 Congress reacted by reinforcing the FTC's enforcement
powers over false advertising claims with the Wheeler-Lea Amend-
ments to the FTC Act.15
The Wheeler-Lea Amendments16 changed the wording of the
FTC's jurisdictional grant. Whereas the FTC could previously attack
"unfair methods of competition,"' 7 it was now granted authority to
interdict "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce."' 8 The
FTC could now "center its attention on the direct protection of the
consumer where formerly it could protect him only indirectly through
the protection of the competitor."' 9 The Supreme Court, in FTC v.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., construed the Amendments to provide
power to the FTC to regulate deceptive advertising.20 The Court held
that section 5 of the FTC Act empowers the FTC to define unfair
practices regardless of any actual violation of the letter of the law and
regardless of any effect on competition.2' In its quest for fairness in
advertising, the Commission may, "like a court of equity, consider
public values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encom-
passed in the spirit of the antitrust laws." 22
The FTC's powers were further broadened in 1975 by the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act.23 The Act confirmed the FTC's ability to promulgate rules and
regulations concerning unfair and deceptive practices. 24 Additionally,
the Act authorized the Commission to bring civil actions in federal
court for certain violations of the rules, without any prior cease and
desist orders.25 The Commission can also bring civil actions on behalf
of injured consumers. The breadth of the FTC's powers was also en-
hanced by further additions to section 5: "unfair methods of competi-
tion in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
13. 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
14. Id. at 649.
15. Wheeler-Lea Act, Pub. L. No. 447, 52 Stat. 111 (1938).
16. Id.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1992).
18. Wheeler-Lea Act, Pub. L. No. 447.
19. Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1941).
20. 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 244.
23. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2193 (1975).
24. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1906, 93rd Cong., 2d Session 31 (1974).
25. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2193 (1975).
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in or affecting commerce are hereby declared unlawful."26 With this
increase in the jurisdiction of the FTC to include even those practices
which merely affect commerce, Congress granted the Commission the
broadest of powers to deal with deceptive practices."
B. FTC Practice
The FTC may implement its goals by several methods. The most
often employed tool is the cease and desist order obtained by hearing
or consent decree. The order enjoins violative activity and prevents
future violations. The only limit on the scope of the FTC's powers is
that the relief must be reasonably related to the unlawful practices.2"
This limit is not burdensome however, and courts have upheld broad
orders applicable to all products of one manufacturer, reasoning that
a narrower order directed at only one product would simply permit
the manufacturer to shift its deceptive practices to other items.29 Or-
ders restricting general methods of practice have also been upheld.30
The Supreme Court has stated that the Commission "cannot be re-
quired to confine its road block to the narrow lane the transgressor
has traveled; it must be allowed effectively to close all roads to the
prohibited goal, so that its order may not be by-passed with
impunity."31
The Commission is also authorized to require affirmative disclosure
to correct deceptive practices.32 The FTC may require such disclo-
sure "to protect customers from their own ignorance and improvi-
dence."33 For example, in National Commission on Egg Nutrition v.
FTC, the Commission required conspicuously printed information re-
garding the correlation between cholesterol and heart disease if the
egg industry printed its own interpretation of the correlation.34 Sub-
26. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1992).
27. See American Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986). The only limits are procedural.
28. Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946).
29. ITT Continental Baking Co. v. FTC, 532 F.2d 207, 223 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding
an FTC order applying to "all products" manufactured by defendant not to be overly
broad).
30. Consumer Prods. of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 400 F.2d 930, 933 (3d Cir. 1968) (barring
all methods of defendant's deceptive sale practices by FTC order).
31. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952).
32. J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967) (requiring the manufac-
turer of Geritol to disclose that claimed property of relieving tiredness would only occur
if the symptom was caused by iron deficiency). See Warner Lambert Co. v. FTC, 86
F.T.C. 1398 (1975), modified and enforced, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 950 (1978).
33. KINTNER, supra note 11, at 75.
34. 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
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sequently, the courts "have accorded the Commission wide latitude in
ordering advertisers to make disclosures which limit or counteract af-
firmative advertising claims."" However, there are some limits to
this power. The Commission may not compel advertising for purely
informational reasons.
3 6
Similar to the affirmative disclosure power is the power to require
deceivers to air remedial advertising. The FTC may force manufac-
turers to air new advertising in order to correct any residual beliefs
the public may maintain, even after discontinuation of the deceptive
practice.37 For example, the FTC required the makers of Listerine
mouthwash to advertise that the product did not prevent colds as had
been advertised and believed by consumers for over a half century.38
Similarly, the Commission required the STP Corporation to publish
an "FTC Notice" in several national publications regarding FTC vio-
lations.3 9 STP was required to spend $200,000 on the advertising
campaign. 4°
The FTC also has powers to help manufacturers avoid violations of
the Act. The FTC often gives advisory opinions regarding specific
activities.41 Of a more general nature, since 1955, the FTC has cre-
ated Trade Practice Guides pursuant to Trade Practice Conferences
in order to establish nonviolative practices in many types of indus-
try.42 Accepted examples are the Guides Against Deceptive Pricing43
and the Guides Against Bait Advertising." Although the Guides are
not binding in future litigation, they are generally followed as an indi-
cator of the FTC's intentions.
35. American Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1983).
36. Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36, 38-39 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 818 (1950)
("The Commission is not given general charter to police the expenditure of the public's
money or generally to do whatever is considered by it to be good and beneficial." The
court held that the FTC acted beyond its powers). The opinion has been criticized heav-
ily and radically limited. See Warner Lambert, 562 F.2d at 759.
37. See Warner Lambert Co. v. FTC, 86 F.T.C. 1398 (1975), modified and enforced,
562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978); Grolier Inc. v. FTC, 699
F.2d 983 (9th Cir.) (requiring mandatory disclosure to prospective book purchasers) cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Encyclopedia, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 964 (7th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980) (same).
38. Warner Lambert Co. v. FTC, 86 F.T.C. 1398 (1975), modified and enforced, 562
F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978).
39. STP Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,390 (1978).
40. Id.
41. William D. Dixon, Federal Trade Commission Advisory Opinions, 18 ADMIN. L.
REV. 67 (1965).
42. See Sumner S. Kittelle & Elmer Mostow, A Review of the Trade Practice Confer-
ences of the Federal Trade Commission, 8 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 427 (1940).
43. 16 C.F.R. § 233 (1992).
44. 16 C.F.R. § 238 (1992).
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The FTC issues binding guidelines in the form of the Trade Regula-
tion Rules.45 The FTC has authority to issue substantive rules which
define unfair or deceptive acts or practices and which "may include
requirements prescribed for the purpose of preventing such acts or
practices."46 An example of the Trade Regulation Rules is the rule
requiring a cooling-off period for door-to-door sales .4  The power to
bind many constituents engaged in many activities by one Rule is yet
another formidable power held by the Commission. Furthermore, all
FTC powers may be enforced by civil and criminal sanctions. 8
III. The FTC and Advertising
A. FTC Action Upon Advertising
The FTC is required to act "in the public interest."' 9 Although
this requirement was once a possible defense against FTC attack, it
has since been relaxed to such a degree that it is no longer a limitation
on the Commission. 50 Generally, the Commission is considered the
best judge of public interest when the interest is determined by public
injury.5" The Commission has declared sufficient "public interest" to
take action upon a finding of only one dissatisfied customer, "before
the customer suffered any more pecuniary loss than the price of a
postage stamp."' 52 Another example of the FTC's broad interpreta-
tion of the term "public interest" is found in Book-of-the-Month Club,
Inc. 53 In that case, public interest was found where less than one per-
cent of the club's customers-only thirteen people-were affected by
the deceptive use of the term "free". 5' Thus, the FTC may act "in the
public interest" when even the slightest number of the public is
deceived.
After a finding of a need to act in the public interest, the FTC must
find that the advertisement's representation related to a material fac-
tor in the consumer's decision to purchase. The FTC may infer this
45. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 57(a), 88 Stat. 2193.
46. Id.
47. 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (1992).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 50, § 54.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b).
50. Bear Hill Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 89 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1938) (holding the likelihood
of injury to the public to be a sufficient public interest).
51. See Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1961).
52. Id. at 873.
53. 48 F.T.C. 1297 (1952), enforced, 202 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 346 U.S.
883 (1953).
54. Id.
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materiality of deception," and as with the involvement of public in-
terest, the requirement has been relaxed. The FTC has inferred mate-
rial deception based on subjective interpretations of the consumer's
expectations. 56 For example, in Leonard F Porter Inc., the FTC in-
ferred the materiality of representations regarding the origins of man-
ufactured souvenirs which were identical to native Alaskan,
handcrafted souvenirs." Materiality existed because any misrepre-
sentation as to the superior native Alaskan origin was likely to induce
purchase.58 Even subjective interpretations of emotional responses to
advertising may support materiality. 9 In Book-of-the-Month Club,
Inc., the materiality of the deception was based on the emotional, ava-
ricious response to the term "free", rather than on any objective re-
sponse which could be interpreted rationally.'
Not only may subjectivity play a role in determining deception, but
there is no requirement that someone actually be deceived. A mere
tendency to deceive is sufficient to mandate FTC interdiction.6 1
Stated one court: "it is not necessary... to find that actual deception
resulted. It is sufficient to find that the natural and probable result of
the challenged practice is to cause one to do that which he would not
otherwise do."' 6 2 In this area, the FTC is given complete leeway.
Facts evidencing actual deception of the public need not be shown by
the FTC.63 Representations merely having a "capacity to deceive"
are unlawful. 6" The only exception to the rule is an allowance for
good old-fashioned sales "puffing".65
55. FTC v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
56. Id. at 391.
57. 88 F.T.C. 546 (1976).
58. Id. at 628.
59. It is the reaction of the group to whom the advertisement is directed that is dis-
positive of the issue. American Home Prods. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160, 165-
66 (2d Cir. 1978).
60. 48 F.T.C. 1297 (1952).
61. Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. FTC 594 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1979).
62. Bockenstette v. FTC, 134 F.2d 369, 371 (10th Cir. 1943) (citing Pep Boys-
Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc. v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1941)); Brown Fence & Wire v.
FTC, 64 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1933).
63. See Doherty, Clifford, Steers & Shenfield v. FTC 392 F.2d 921, 925 (6th Cir.
1968) ("The Commission is permitted to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence
and its findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence"). See also Exposition
Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 917 (1962).
64. Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944) (FTC
produced no deceived consumers as witnesses). See also FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive, 380
U.S. 374, 391-92 (1965) (finding that a public survey is not needed to determine that the
ad may mislead).
65. Ostermoor & Co. v. FTC, 16 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1927) (holding mattress filling
expanded out of opened end was proper puffing); Kidder Oil Co. v. FTC, 117 F.2d 892
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Thus, the FTC may restrain practices which might only deceive the
most credulous consumers.66 Regardless, the Commission need not
prove the existence of these gullible people. The courts have upheld
the validity of this goal. 67 Hence, the FTC is the guardian of the igno-
rant, unthinking and credulous, 6  the defender of "Mortimer
Snerds"69 and the protector of "wayfaring men, though fools."7 This
victim of deception may not read all that he should, and may merely
grab a general impression.71 He has a very short attention span.72
This is not a reasonable man.73 Because of the hypothetical ignorance
of those the FTC seeks to protect, a potential deceiver cannot claim
the defense that any person in his or her right mind would not be
deceived by the advertisement.74 This argument has been rejected by
the FTC as without merit. 75 The important criterion is the net im-
pression which the advertisement makes to the public, and while some
may realize the falsity of the claims, there are others who will not; the
FTC may insist on "the most literal truthfulness in advertisements"
for that very reason.7 6 "Laws are made to protect the trusting as well
as the suspicious.
77
The standard set by the FTC is so high that it is often impossible to
overcome, even if the advertisement is truthful, or is believed to be
truthful. Literal truthfulness of the advertisement is not enough to
(7th Cir. 1941) (holding motor oil described as "perfect" is proper puffing). But see FTC
v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112 (1937) (concluding that a representation that an
encyclopedia was free, even though it required a ten year extension service costing the
same price as the encyclopedia, is not reasonable puffing).
66. See Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1961) (FTC must pro-
tect the least sophisticated reader).
67. Standard Oil Co. of California v. FTC 577 F.2d 653, 657 (9th Cir. 1978).
68. Id.
69. Independent Directory Corp., 47 F.T.C. 13, 31 (1950) (Commissioner L.B. Ma-
son, dissenting).
70. General Motors Corp. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312
U.S. 682 (1941) (Judge Augustus Hand stated that the FTC may protect those of whom
the prophet Isaiah spoke: "the wayfaring men, though fools, shall not err therein").
71. Resort Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 827 (1975).
72. Book of the Month Club, Inc., 48 F.T.C., 1297 (1952). This is a particular disad-
vantage when watching TV.
73. WILLIAM PROSSER, TORTS 738 (3d ed. 1964). The reasonable man is skeptical.
74. Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944). See also
Gelb v. FTC, 144 F.2d 580, 583 (2d Cir. 1944) (J. Clark, dissenting) (the argument is "a
defense repudiated every time it has been offered on appellate review").
75. 143 F.2d 676; 144 F.2d 580.
76. 143 F.2d 676; 144 F.2d 580.
77. FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937).
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escape FTC scrutiny and a finding of illegality in some instances.7 8
A statement may be deceptive even if the constituent words may be
literally or technically construed so as to not constitute a misrepre-
sentation .... The buying public does not weigh each word in an
advertisement or representation. It is important to ascertain the
impression that is likely to be created upon the prospective
purchaser.79
Furthermore, knowledge that the ad is false is unimportant to a deter-
mination of illegality.80 This is because no benefits from the misrepre-
sentation may be maintained by the deceiver, no matter how innocent
the misrepresentation.81 Thus, the overall impression of the ad is just
as important to a determination of deceptive representation as the in-
dividual words, regardless of the intentions and beliefs of the perpe-
trator of the deception.82
The FTC has also looked at the message as a whole when an adver-
tisement has communicated meaning by ambiguity and innuendo
rather than by the words' actual meanings. Therefore, an ad laden
with innuendo which can be read between the lines may be just as
deceptive as one with expressly deceptive terms.8 3 Ambiguity may
also constitute deception. The prohibition against ambiguity is exem-
plified by the Commission's attacks on the word "cure" and substitu-
tion of "relief" as more appropriate.84 When there is no known cure
for an ailment, pharmaceutical firms may not say that their product is
such, but they may claim their product offers relief.85 Similarly, in
Gelb v. FTC, the FTC barred Clairol from describing a new hair dye
as "permanent."8 6 The deception lies in both the product's inability
to alter the color of new hair as it grows, as well as the product's
inability to dye hair permanently. One witness testified that although
the ad said the product was permanent, she knew that this did not
mean she would never have to use a dye again. 7 The FTC, invoking
78. Kalwajtys v. FTC, 237 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1025
(1957).
79. Id. at 656.
80. D.D.D. Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1942).
81. FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 81 (1934).
82. See Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1942).
83. Personal Drug Co., 50 F.T.C. 828 (1954) (advertising abortifacient by innuendo).
84. See Walker Medicine Co. v. FTC, 18 F.T.C. 16 (1933); Warner Lambert Co. v.
FTC, 86 F.T.C. 1398 (1975), modified and enforced, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978).
85. Id.
86. 144 F.2d 580, 582 (2d Cir. 1944).
87. Id. at 582.
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its duty under Standard Education88 to protect the ignorant as well as
the skeptical, held that because the advertisement was ambiguous, it
was also deceptive.89 The FTC therefore will act in the public interest
to stop material deception, ambiguity, innuendo and other statements
which may deceive even if only the most ignorant would be
deceived.90
The FTC is also empowered by section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act to proceed against "unfair" practices. 91 In recent
years, the FTC has broadened the scope of its power under the unfair-
ness provision of section 5.92 An activity may be found to be unfair
pursuant to section 5 if: "(1) . . .the practice, without necessarily
having been ... considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has
been established by statutes, the common law,. . . or other established
concept of unfairness; (2) ... it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or
unscrupulous; [and] (3) ... it causes substantial injury .... , If a
suspect activity oversteps these parameters, the activity may violate
the section 5 ban on unfairness, even though deception is not in-
volved. The FTC, therefore, is vested with broad discretion to attack
new and innovative practices which are not proscribed by statute or
common law.94 This power overlaps and extends FTC power beyond
the interception of deceptive acts to include those acts which are
purely unfair to the consumer.
With the many restrictions placed on advertisers by the FTC, these
advertisers are faced with the task of presenting honest and under-
standable information supported by concrete evidence. The Commis-
sion will seek to protect even the most ignorant and credulous
consumer, so the advertiser must be extremely cautious as to the
meaning of his message. Literal truth and belief in the truth of the
claim do not affect the Commission's determination of the illegality of
the ad. Furthermore, double meaning, no matter how remote, may
create illegality. These tenets apply to the realm of television advertis-
ing with equal force, although that medium has also presented the
Commission with unique problems.
88. 302 U.S. 112 (1937).
89. 144 F.2d at 582.
90. See supra notes 66-77.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b).
92. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
93. Id. at 244-45 n.5.
94. All State Industries, 75 F.T.C. 465 (1969), enforced, 423 F.2d 423 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970).
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B. FTC Action Upon Television Advertising
With the presence of televisions in almost every home in America,
the television advertisement is an especially powerful tool in the hands
of marketers.95 The vast impact of TV advertisements, combined
with the heightened possibility of misrepresentation because of the au-
dio-visual nature of the medium, incite the special concern of the
FTC. In particular, the Commission has required, as in other forms
of advertising, that the representations in television ads equal the
message to be conveyed about the product.96 For example, to demon-
strate the invisible protection of a toothpaste, an announcer stood be-
hind a plastic shield while a tennis ball was thrown at him which
bounced off harmlessly. 97 The demonstration was found to be
deceptive because such complete protection as was implied by the
demonstration was impossible. 98 The FTC concluded that the repre-
sentation therefore conveyed a message that was not true.99
Similarly, when the Ford Motor Company, in a comparison to
highway guard rails, demonstrated the strength of guard rails on a
Ford LTD by lifting the car by its rails with a crane, the Commission
found the ad to be deceptive. °° The Commission reasoned that the
highway rails have horizontal strength, whereas the car's rails have
vertical strength, therefore the comparison and demonstration were
inapposite and deceptive. 101 If the demonstration does not show any-
thing at all, the ad will be deceptive as well. In another Ford case, a
car was shown to be less noisy than riding in a glider. The Commis-
sion halted the ad, finding that neither was actually very quiet and the
comparison only proved that the car was the quieter of the two. 10 2
Thus, the representations made by demonstrations on television ad-
vertisements must actually and accurately reflect the capabilities of
the claim to be proved.
This requirement has led to problems specific to the creation of TV
ads which often entail the use of mock-ups.10 3 Mock-ups are neces-
sary when making television advertisements because of the problem-
95. See infra note 170.
96. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 58 F.T.C. 422 (1961).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 431.
100. Ford Motor Co., 84 F.T.C. 729, 731 (1974), afid, 547 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 915 (1977).
101. Id. at 732.
102. Id. at 733.
103. See Note, Illusion or Deception: The Use of "Props" and "Mock-Ups" in Televi-
sion Advertising, 72 YALE L.J. 145 (1962). See generally VANCE PACKARD, THE HID-
DEN PERSUADERS (1975).
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atic nature of the video medium. For example, mashed potatoes must
be substituted for ice cream because of the hot lights used on the sets,
soap is added to beer to give it froth and glycerine is sprayed on soda
cans to create a frosty appearance. Similarly, special lighting may be
necessary to create correct color on video. However, the FTC has
determined that there are limits to what advertisement producers may
mock-up."° One infamous example of an improper mock-up in-
volved Campbell's mock-up of its soup. 0 Marbles were added to the
bowl of soup in the commercial to make it appear more filled with
solids, which would normally sink. Campbell's agreed in a consent
order to stop showing the deceptive ad.106
The Supreme Court dealt with the mock-up issue in Colgate
Palmolive Co. v. FTC.07 Colgate's commercial depicted a shaving
cream which was so moist that after application, a razor could shave
sand off sandpaper. 0 The FTC claimed that the ad was deceptive
because the feat would actually require several minutes soaking. °9
Furthermore, the ad was accomplished by mock-up with sand sprin-
kled on plexiglass because the producers said real sandpaper would
only look like plain paper."10 The Court held that such actions were
deceptive misrepresentations regardless of the product's capabilities to
perform the feat because the use of a mock-up alone will dupe an
unknowing public.I" Thus, the TV ad maker may not use mock-ups
and must be especially careful that a product demonstration is exactly
that, an actual demonstration." 2 All of these FTC standards are
equally applicable to the new infomercial genre.
IV. Infomercials
Infomercials, or "paid programming," are the latest twist in adver-
tising and represent another way in which advertisers have managed
to package their messages. The infomercial format was developed as
104. FTC v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
105. Campbell Soup Co., 77 F.T.C. 664 (1970).
106. Id. at 676.
107. 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
108. Id. at 376.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 376-77.
111. Id. at 377.
112. Needless to say Colgate-Palmolive was met with hatred by ad makers. As one
stated, "with this precedent upheld by the courts, creative advertising, imaginative adver-
tising, mind-stimulating advertising, is gone for good." Printer's Ink, Feb. 2, 1962, at 57,
cited in A New Antitoxin to Advertising Artifice-Television Advertising and the Federal
Trade Commission, 37 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 524 (1962). However, infomercials have
proved this self-depreciating ad man wrong.
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a method of creating an audience for half hour commercials. While
no one would knowingly sit down and watch a half hour commercial,
advertisers ingeniously realized that the public would watch a half
hour commercial masquerading as a talk show. Advertisers also real-
ized the tremendous financial savings to be made by purchasing half
hour blocks of late night time as compared to thirty second prime
time slots.113 Although they are a practical and innovative method of
advertising, infomercials "have been regarded as a seamy underside of
the advertising business."114 Even television stations have grown to
dislike the format which has substantially bolstered their own reve-
nues. "5 Ironically, ninety percent of the same independent stations
that do not approve of the format, carry infomercial programming,
and it is considered a growing trend.116
Examples of the infomercial species can be found on TV at almost
any time, but they are more prevalent late at night.'17 Among some
of the products promoted are miracle diets, 1 ' balding cures,1 19
makeup,12° car wax,121 tooth whiteners,122 high-fiber diet cookies, 23
stain removers, 124 exercise machines 25 and a cellulite-reducing sea-
weed gel. 126  The miracle product is typically given center stage
throughout the program. Because the show is often modelled after a
talk show, the "host" gives demonstrations of the product with the
"guests", all to the clapping and cheering of the audience. 127 Usually,
the product is endorsed by people and celebrities who report that they
113. Advertising's Amazing Discovery, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1991, TV Times, at 13.
114. Joanne Lipman, 'Infomercial'Makers Try to Clean Up Act, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4,
1991, at B3.
115. Steve Brennan, Stations Accused of Selling Out to Lure of Infomercial Revenue,
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Jan. 16, 1991, at 4. National Association of Television Pro-
gram Executives hold seminar entitled "Paid Programming: The Money We Hate To
Make".
116. Id.
117. Examples can be found in the TV guide listed as "paid programming".
118. Weight-Reduction Plan Marketers Resolve FTC Deception Allegations, Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), Oct. 31, 1991, at 546.
119. Mark Gill, Splitting Hairs, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1991, Magazine, at 19.
120. Sharon Edelson, Switching Channels; Cosmetics and Beauty Product Infomercials,
WOMAN'S WEAR DAILY, Nov. 1, 1991, at 14.
121. Gary Straus, Infomercial Firm Bouncing Back, USA TODAY, Aug. 6, 1991,
Money, at 8.
122. Id.
123. Barbara Woller, Infomercials Draw Regular Attention, GANNET NEWS SERVICE,
Feb. 15, 1991.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Paul M. Alberta, Synchronal Hit with FTC Action, DM NEWS, Nov. 4, 1991, at 3.
127. Richard Zoglin, Its Amazing, Call Now, TIME MAG., June 17, 1991, Video, at 71.
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have used the product with complete success.128 The infomercial for-
mat emulates typical talk shows in every possible manner.
Other features of the infomercial add to the appearance of an actual
talk show. The infomercial, an advertisement itself, takes regular
breaks throughout the show for "advertisements". Often, these are
advertisements for the same product featured in the infomercial ac-
companied by the purchase information for the product. In one ver-
sion of the infomercial show Amazing Breakthroughs, the
"commercial" breaks were comprised of sections of the rest of the
show spliced together with narration and the purchase information.
The consumer sees an advertisement within an advertisement, all
pitching the same product in a self-referencing circle. Another fea-
ture of infomercials wliich adds to the appearance of an actual talk
show is the running of credits at the end of the show. Typical com-
mercial advertisements do not have credits which would waste pre-
cious and expensive air time.
There are several problems with the format as it now exists, some
novel, and some as old as advertising itself. Foremost, is whether the
product is a legitimate product in the first place. Cures for impotence
and hair loss and a miracle diet have been enjoined altogether.' 29 Said
the director of the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection: "There's
nothing unique about infomercials ... it's the same people who have
been con artists for [sixty] years taking advantage of a new me-
dium." 130 Another primary concern related to whether the product
will work at all is whether it will work for the purchaser as well as it
has for the endorsers on the show. There is also the concern regard-
ing full disclosure to the consumer. The viewer may miss information
that is rapidly spoken or flashed on the screen. Further complaints
have been aired concerning the hard-sell tactics of the shows, and the
misleading statements of the often paid endorsers.' All of these
problems are compounded by the format in which they are presented.
If the shows were not stylized so conspicuously like talk shows, the
viewers would probably not be as prone to misinterpret the informa-
tion presented.
128. Id.
129. In re Twin Star Prods., Inc., No. C 3307 (FTC Oct. 2, 1990) (decision and order).
See FTC v. California Pacific Research Inc., No. CV-N-88-602, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12967 at *14 (N.D. Nev. Aug. 27 ,1991).
130. Barbara Woller, This ad brought to you by.... GANNETT WESTCHESTER NEWS-
PAPERS, Feb. 11, 1991, at C3.
131. This author was told by an FTC spokesperson that all of these problems and
complaints about infomercials have been voiced to the FTC by consumers and congress-
men alike.
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In reaction to the press that has recently surrounded the in-
fomercial format, 3 2 the producers of infomercials have formed the
National Infomercial Marketing Association ("NIMA" or "Associa-
tion") to address some of the problems with the format.1 33 The Asso-
ciation guidelines suggest that infomercials should both tell the truth
and identify themselves.3 4 The proposed guidelines require that in-
fomercials be identified as paid advertising at the beginning and end of
programs, and whenever an 800-telephone number is flashed on the
screen.'35 However, this attempt at self regulation is no more than
adherence to recent FTC decisions regarding certain infomercials.
36
Although NIMA proposes to require NIMA-certified programs to
comply with their formats, the only power of compliance they can
effect would be expulsion from the Association, and notification of the
FTC. "'37 Despite actual impotence to handle the problem, NIMA
claims that "the objective is to weed out the unscrupulous producers
of infomercials whose only ability to sell products comes from decep-
tive claims."' 38 However, it is clear that the problems with the format
are substantial enough that there is a need for FTC intervention de-
spite NIMA's efforts. Infomercials must be brought into compliance
with the FTC guidelines that have already been shaped by prior deci-
sions regarding standard forms of television advertisements.
V. Application of FTC Standards to Infomercials
Given the various FTC decisions regarding television advertising
mentioned in Part III, supra, and the description of infomercials in
Part IV, supra, one can come to several conclusions about the issues
involved in the current trend towards infomercial marketing.
Although the FTC has only acted against certain violators, 39 the in-
escapable conclusion is that if infomercials are not actually deceptive,
132. Stephen Barlas, Infomercial Makers Form Group, DM NEWS, Aug. 6, 1990, at 7.
133. Id.
134. Cheryl Wetzstein, Ad-Show Makers Set Ethics Standards, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 4,
1991, at B5.
135. Id.
136. Specifically, identification at the beginning and end of the program was required
in In re Twin Star Prods., Inc., No. C 3307, at 9 (FTC Oct. 2, 1990) (decision and order).
137. Said a NIMA spokesperson on NBC News, A Closer Look, Mar. 19, 1991. In-
deed, a spokesperson for Rep. Norman Sisisky (D., Va.), a major advocate of infomercial
restriction, said that although they are a good thing, "those guidelines can't really be
enforced." WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1991, at B3.
138. WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1991, at B3.
139. To date, the FTC has taken a case by case approach to infomercials. Sherri Vaz-
zano, TV Ads Policing Own Act, CH1. TRIB., Nov. 23, 1990, Business, at 1.
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they come extremely close to violating established standards for de-
ceptive and unfair practices.
At the outset, the need for FTC action is present. As mentioned
above, the public interest standard is a broad one, 1' ° and the FTC
may intercept offenders when there is even one dissatisfied customer.
Public interest is undeniably present as evidenced by the vast amount
of negative press that has ensued from complaints already voiced
about the infomercials. 'M Furthermore, there are bound to be dissat-
isfied customers in the public given the broad reach of the medium
and the apparent success of the businesses involved in infomercial
marketing.
The second issue in any determination of whether advertising is de-
ceptive is the materiality of any deception to the consumers' decision
to purchase the item advertised. Under the holdings in such cases as
Leonard F Porter Inc.,42 the FTC may infer the materiality of decep-
tion. In the case of infomercials, materiality will be apparent in most
cases. Infomercials are specifically designed to induce consumers to
purchase the products showcased. It stands to reason that any decep-
tion that occurs will be material to a viewer's decision to purchase the
item featured in the commercial.
Finally, infomercials are deceptive by design. Probably the most
objectionable aspect of the infomercial format is the similarity of the
commercial to actual objective programming. This similarity exem-
plifies a tendency to deceive which the FTC has acted against in other
forms of advertising.' 3 The FTC need not search the public for
deceived consumers, it is enough that the probable result will be de-
ception.'"4 Presently, when a viewer tunes into an infomercial, he will
probably not know whether the show is a paid commercial, unless he
has seen the very beginning, or waits until the very end.' 45 This is
unlikely, however, given the prevalence of remote control channel
140. See supra Part III.A. See also Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir.
1977). Public interest found from national broadcast of car ads and national interest in
fuel economy.
141. Mary Beth Grover, Step Right Up Ladies and Gentlemen, FORBES, Oct. 15, 1990;
Barbara Woller, This ad brought to you by.... GANNETT WESTCHESTER NEWSPAPERS,
Feb. 11, 1991, at C3; Richard Zoglin, It's Amazing, Call Now, TIME MAG., June 17, 1991,
Video, at 71.
142. 88 F.T.C. 546, 628 (1976). See supra notes 57-58.
143. See supra Part III.A. See also FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778
F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1985). FTC need not take a survey to find public interest. Id.
144. Bockenstette v. FTC, 134 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1943); Charles of the Ritz Distribs.
Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944).
145. Stuart Elliot, Chameleon Ads Mimic TV, USA TODAY, June 12, 1989, Money, at
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switching. 146 If the viewer does not know what the show is, the prob-
able deception lies in the belief that the program is actual, rather than
paid.
Every feature of the infomercial format is geared towards enhanc-
ing the possibility that the viewer will be deceived. '47 The methods
incorporated by the producers betray this intent. The magazine style
of the infomercial tends to deceive because only actual programs were
formerly presented in such a style. The running of credits at the end
or the show tends to deceive because advertisements have not previ-
ously given credits, whereas actual programing does. It is rarely clear
whether the audience and endorsers are paid, further enhancing the
tendency to deceive. 148 Another significant aspect of the infomercial
format's tendency to deceive is the use of commercial-type "breaks"
during the program. This feature, which is entirely novel, is obviously
an attempt to make the infomercial seem more like a regular show. A
viewer may not suspect such an unnecessary, and therefore unscrupu-
lous, tactic. The very difference between the infomercial talk-show
style and the "fake" commercial's traditional commercial style adds
to an overwhelming tendency to deceive. In addition, since in-
fomercials are advertisements in themselves, they must adhere to FTC
requirements that the representations made on the show equal the ac-
tual capabilities of the product. 149 However, some infomercials have
such unbelievable demonstrations, they may not even satisfy that
requirement.
As has been voiced by many courts, the FTC and the law are estab-
lished to protect the ignorant as well as the savvy.1 50 Some in-
fomercial producers have claimed the oft-tried defense that no person
of ordinary intelligence would be fooled by an infomercial into think-
ing it was an actual talk show. They claim that American television
viewers are so sophisticated that they comprehend the origin and
value of every second of every program they watch. 5 ' This argument
however is not a defense to FTC action. The overall impression that
146. Id.
147. See Simeon Management Corp. v. FTC, 579 F.2d 1137, 1146 n.1 (9th Cir. 1989)
("Advertisements having the capacity to deceive are deceptive within the meaning of the
FTCA; actual deception need not be shown.").
148. See FTC v. Inecto, Inc., 16 F.T.C. 198, 225 (2d Cir. 1935) (enjoining advertise-
ment with paid endorsers which implied otherwise). This policy has also been incorpo-
rated into the FTC Guides on the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising.
149. See supra Part III.B.
150. Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944). See
supra notes 66-77.
151. This was the statement of a NIMA spokesperson on NBC News, A Closer Look,
Mar. 19, 1991.
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the infomercial makes is that it is a talk show: the deception lies in
this alone, regardless of however many people realize that it is not.I52
The format has attracted so much attention already because even the
majority of sophisticated TV viewers have been deceived upon first
encountering the genre." 3
Even though infomercials may be within the letter of the law as the
format does not violate any Trade Regulation Rule and there is no
explicit law which prevents their production, 54 they may still violate
the section 5 prohibition against deception. As mentioned above, the
overall impression created by the advertisement is what is to be
tested.155 The overall impression of infomercials may fail section 5
because, as has been demonstrated, they have a strong tendency to
deceive even sophisticated viewers into believing they are watching an
objective show. Thus, the ambiguity inherent in the format alone may
be enough to violate FTC standards, regardless of what is actually
depicted in the infomercial. The format is ambiguous primarily be-
cause the viewer is left unsure as to whether it is a commercial or a
program, and secondarily because even if the viewer knows it is a
commercial he may read into the program the objective qualities he
believes should be part of any show that looks so much like an objec-
tive show. In other words, the viewers may fool themselves into ad-
ding a believable quality to the show, even if the show is known to be
an advertisement. Again, deception is highly likely.
Even if the format is not a deceptive practice, infomercials may be
an unfair act or practice, regardless of the possibility for deception. 56
The application of the FTC's three prong test for unfairness demon-
strates the infomercial's violation of section 5.157 Deception of the
type prevalent in infomercials offends public policy as delineated in
common law, thereby violating the first prong.15 8 Infomercials make
the false representation that they are objective, a representation which
the producers know to be incorrect, and which consumers rely on
when making purchases. 5 9 Furthermore, the infomercial violates the
152. Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1963) ("The Commission
need not confine itself to the literal meaning of the words used but may look to the overall
impact of the entire commercial").
153. Indeed, this writer was fooled the first time he saw one. Of course, this may or
may not support the argument that they have a strong tendency to deceive.
154. See supra note 138. The FTC has not acted against the format, only against indi-
vidual ads which would fail for other reasons regardless of format.
155. Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1963).
156. See supra notes 91-94.
157. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5 (1972).
158. See WILLIAM PROSSER, TORTS § 105, at 685 (4th ed. 1971).
159. See Jones v. West Side Buick Auto Co., 93 S.W.2d 1083 (1936) (finding misrepre-
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second prong because it is unscrupulous and unethical to make a
viewer believe, by the employment of all the style and characteristics
of objective talk shows, that he is watching an objective talk show,
when he is not. Thus, the second prong is satisfied."6 Finding the
substantial injury, and therefore the public interest which is necessary
to complete the tripartite test, is not difficult.161 The consumer who
purchases as a result of the violations of the first two prongs is injured
in the amount of whatever money he has spent, while under the im-
pression that he was watching a regular TV show.
Infomercial producers are not being careful to present the clearest
form of advertisement that they can. It should be recognized that
clarity was never their intention. The only way to get people to watch
a thirty minute commercial is to make the commercial as much like a
real show as possible. Infomercials do just that; they imitate real tele-
vision programming, something which they are not. The FTC has
found violations of the Act by far more cautious advertisers.
Thus, the application of the FTC standards developed by case law
to infomercials as they are currently presented, establishes that in-
fomercials are either deceptive or unfair and thus should be curtailed.
VI. Conclusion
Given the current tendencies of infomercial programming to
deceive the unwary consumer, what are the actions that the FTC can
take to resolve the problem? Probably the simplest way of dealing
with the problem would be for the FTC to require infomercials to
identify themselves as paid advertisements at all times. 16 2 The identi-
fication can be done by a small notice, icon or symbol, appearing
throughout the infomercial. 163 Such an identification would alert the
viewer to the fact that he or she is watching a paid advertisement, and
not an objective talk show. The ad-icon should be superimposed upon
sentation where a used car dealer turned back odometer before sale). Infomercials are a
similar case. The representation that the infomercial is objective is a similar "non-repre-
sentation" which is in current industry-wide use. It is false, material, and present to any
buyer of infomercial merchandise. The infomercial marketers know the falsity of the
deception and intend it. Finally, the viewer may reasonably rely on the appearance of the
show as an objective talk show. He will be injured by the amount he has spent on the
reliance.
160. See supra text accompanying note 93.
161. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
162. Consumer advocate David Horowitz has also suggested a continuous disclaimer
for infomercials. NBC News, A Closer Look, Mar. 19, 1991.
163. This practice is already in use by a major music video channel, VH-1, which
identifies itself by a small clear label in the bottom right hand corner of the screen. For
lack of a better term for such a symbol, it is referred to herein as an "ad-icon" or "icon".
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a corner of the television screen at all times so that those who do not
see the very beginning, or end, of the infomercial will know that they
are watching paid programing. This type of identification is already
used in newspapers when a lengthy article-style advertisement incor-
porates the same typeset as the paper. Newspapers put "Paid Adver-
tisement" at the top of the page to distinguish the ad from their own
articles. Once the consumer is informed that what he or she is watch-
ing is a paid commercial, the possible violation of FTC law vanishes.
Infomercial producers will surely protest such a minor requirement
as a burdensome "scarlet letter".164 However, given the scope of the
present deception, the remedy requiring affirmative disclosure by such
a noninterfering method is hardly a scarlet letter. An ad-icon's place-
ment on the screen would not detract from the potency of the adver-
tisement. Nor would the icon distract from the viewing of the
infomercial because of its permanent placement on the screen for the
duration of the commercial. Such an icon would be appropriate and
functional, without hindering the ability of the advertisement to ac-
complish its function: to advertise. The fears of advertisers that it
subjects them to a tattoo or scarlet letter is only a function of their
desire to maintain the appearance of an actual show, and thereby
maintain their deception of the public. It is definitely not beyond the
powers of the FTC to halt this kind of activity. 6 ' Indeed, it is the
Commission's raison d'etre.
Clearly, the FTC has the power to prescribe such a remedy under
"affirmative disclosure" cases such as Warner Lambert.'66 This is ex-
actly the type of deception that requires affirmative notice from the
advertiser in order to prevent deception of the viewer. Furthermore, a
simple ad-icon could be most easily accomplished by a Trade Regula-
tion Rule binding all infomercial producers to adhere to nondeceptive
practices. Although a single consent order might be enough to make
NIMA members follow certain practices, as has been mentioned,
NIMA cannot enforce any guidelines they espouse. Furthermore,
there is always the probability that those producers who are not mem-
164. In Nathaniel Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter, Hester Prynne must wear a red
letter "A" as punishment for being an adulteress. NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE
SCARLET LETTER (Bantam Books 1986) (1850). Certainly, if one chooses an "A" as the
universal icon for advertisement, the analogy is hardly stretched. See Invasion of the
Infomercials, N.Y. NEWSDAY, July 23, 1989, at 6 (rejecting proposed icon).
165. See supra Part II.
166. See supra Part II, note 38 and accompanying text. In Warner Lambert, the FTC
required disclosure that Listerine does not cure colds, as well as a cessation of the adver-
tising that it did cure colds. Warner Lambert Co. v. FTC, 86 F.T.C. 1398 (1975), modi-
fied and enforced, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978).
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bers of NIMA will continue to deceive by refusing to use an ad-icon.
A Trade Guide would also be insufficient because it is also not bind-
ing. 167 A Trade Regulation Rule is therefore the most appropriate
method of reaching all those involved in the industry, and of dealing
with the problem in a permanent and universal manner.
Because of the existing deception and the explosive growth of the
infomercial industry, the FTC should act now.' 6s Although it is
claimed that more prominent corporations are interested in the me-
dium, 169 the fact that larger and more sophisticated corporations are
getting involved does not mean that viewer deception would suddenly
cease. 170 Furthermore, the bigger budgets of the larger corporations
may increase the ability of the producers to accomplish their goal of
duplicating real talk shows, thereby increasing the tendency to
deceive.
Another reason the FTC should act is because of the vast power of
the television medium. The many cases that have been tried against
TV advertisers are testament to the scrutiny with which the FTC has
previously investigated television advertising.' 17 Since the TV quiz
show scandals of the 1950s' 72 the FTC has sworn: "[a]ny advertising
of doubtful integrity will be investigated on a priority basis, with the
scope of the investigation to reach all those responsible for the decep-
tion."'173 If this is indeed true, the FTC should not let its monitoring
of television advertisements flag when the problems of infomercials
are already rampant, and will become more prevalent as the industry
grows. A cautionary message voiced thirty years ago is still relevant:
"[T]he fact remains that television advertising carries powerful influ-
ence. With its ability to emphasize and re-emphasize its point both to
the audio and visual senses, television's 60-second messages should be
viewed with microscopic care to sift out any tendency to deceive. If
for no other reason, so that 'fools shall not enter therein'."' 174 Surely
167. See supra Part IIB, notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
168. Over $450 million was spent on infomercials in 1989. Mary Beth Grover, Step
Right Up Ladies and Gentlemen, FORBES, Oct. 15, 1990, at 43.
169. Volvo is just one example. Paul A. Eisenstein, Volvo's Safety First Image Stalling,
INVESTOR Bus. DAILY, Oct. 15, 1991 at 3.
170. Furthermore, just because big business is involved does not mean that deception
will not be attempted, as a glance at the ranks of the companies that have already been
stopped by the FTC from ongoing deception of the public will confirm. See supra notes
100-02 and accompanying text.
171. See supra Part III.B.
172. See SIDNEY W. HEAD, BROADCASTING IN AMERICA 209-11 (4th ed. 1982).
173. A New Antitoxin to Advertising Artifice-Television Advertising and the Federal
Trade Commission, 37 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 524, 528 (1962) (quoting Earl W. Kintner,
FTC Chairman).
174. Id. at 538.
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the author of this warning never would have conceived that thirty
minutes would be added to the message, and the goal would be to
imitate real television shows. The need for "microscopic care" 175 is
undiminished today. Infomercials must identify themselves to the
viewer in order to avoid further public deception and injury.
W.H. Ramsay Lewis
175. Id.
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